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ABSTRACT
Advanced  techniques  of  Non-Intrusive  Load  Monitoring  (NILM)  can  provide 
power  consumers  with  opportunities  to  easily  and  accurately  track  their  own energy 
usage.  However, as with any other powerful technology, there is a darker side to NILM. 
Since detailed monitoring requires only information about the overall power draw over a 
period of time, sources of such information could be used for any number of purposes. 
While  some legal  protections  exist  for personal  information reported to a  utility,  and 
digital  defenses  make  it  difficult  for  unauthorized  parties  to  obtain  meter  data,  such 
measures are not infallible.  They do nothing to prevent abuse by the utility itself or the 
surreptitious installation of a monitoring device outside a residence, place of business, 
embassy, etc.  Therefore, a method to reduce the ability of attackers to deduce private 
information from an observed power signal is proposed, using some knowledge of the 
loads  being  hidden  to  offset  identifiable  load  signatures  in  the  signal  for  maximum 
ambiguity.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
An Unmet Need
The development of effective Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM) technology 
has many potentially useful applications.  With a single device hooked into a system, the 
complicated combination of loads can be untangled from the total power being pulled 
from the grid,  so individual  power-consuming devices  can be tracked and compared. 
Inefficiency and waste can easily be identified, large loads can be tagged for potential 
participation in demand response, and it becomes possible to verify that these devices 
respond correctly to a demand response event.  NILM is a valuable tool for those wishing 
to better understand and control their own consumption.
However,  the  very  same  techniques  so  helpful  to  a  facility  manager  seeking  to 
eliminate inefficiencies in system operation can be turned (for example) to purposes of 
industrial espionage.  In a residential setting, a recent study found that detailed tracking 
of power consumption could lead to highly accurate tracking of the residents as well [1], 
resulting in decreased privacy and increased vulnerability (e.g., a savvy criminal could 
easily case a neighborhood undetected, or a stalker could monitor a target's daily routine). 
As smart meters are being deployed across the country, the potential consequences of 
their  adoption  and  the  detailed  metering  data  they  will  make  available   are  worth 
consideration.
 This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy under Award Number DE-OE0000097.
2Ethical  questions  about  the  pursuit  of  such  technology  were  raised  over  two 
decades ago [2]; but to date – despite the recent push toward detailed power data on a  
network  of  digitally  enabled  meters  –  little  has  been  done  to  prevent  unauthorized 
monitoring.  An innovative Automatic Metering Infrastructure (AMI) system architecture 
designed to avoid the central collection of fine-granularity consumption data in a form 
identifiable with individual energy customers has been proposed [3].  This system, if 
implemented, serves to deter misuse of data by the utility or someone who gains access to 
the  utility's  database.   However,  it  does  not  prevent  targeted  invasions  of  individual 
customers, such as a  company estimating a competitor's production by monitoring the 
power drawn by a manufacturing facility.   Present-day defenses focus exclusively on 
protecting the metered data – not the personal information embedded in that data and the 
power signal itself.  
Figure 1 illustrates the current state of defenses at the major points of attack: the 
meters, the data transmission system, the data stored at the utility, and the power signal 
close to the particular facility of interest .  (Figures appear at the end of each chapter.)  As 
the  facility's  power  signal  is  mixed  in  with  others  through  the  distribution  and 
transmission system, it becomes significantly more difficult to tie any specific aspect of 
the aggregate signal to the particular facility in question and therefore poses little threat 
with sufficient separation.  While there are undoubtedly some legal issues attached to 
hacking a meter or eavesdropping on the transmission of power data to the utility, people 
willing to employ such methods are not primarily deterred by their illegality – thus the 
most effective line of defense is currently digital.   Likewise,  while data stored at  the
3utility is likely to have some sort of digital protection, it is easily accessible to various 
parties.  The primary deterrents to abuse of that data are the legally defined guidelines for 
their use.  Access to the data in the power signal itself is prevented only by the practical 
problem of installing a sensor on the line (or near enough to the line to measure the 
magnetic field) somewhere in the distribution system before the signal is drowned out by 
neighboring loads .
The  potential  harms  born  of  this  grid  upgrade  have  been  explored  more 
extensively elsewhere  [1],  [2],  [4],  [5].   Presented  here  is  one  technological  defense 
against unauthorized and unwanted monitoring using targeted alterations to the signal, 
reducing the transmission of personal information.  The sketchy protections currently in 
place  are  not  sufficient  to  adequately  preserve  privacy.   Further  defenses  must  be 
developed so that the benefits of a smarter grid can be enjoyed while the potential harms 
are mitigated.
Figures
Fig. 1: Primary protections against abuse in a smart meter system
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4CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
Inadequacies of Current Protections
The  two major  types  of  existing  protection  against  invasive  analysis  of  one's 
power signal are legal and digital.  However, despite these efforts to prevent access to the 
data by unauthorized third parties (and abuse by authorized parties), they still  do not 
significantly limit the ability of outside parties to gain access to, and analyze, anyone's 
power signal.
One  major  weakness  of  the  current  system is  that  it  still  puts  unnecessarily 
revealing information about a person's activity and habits in the hands of at least one 
outside entity: the utility.  A utility needs to know how much to bill a customer for the 
power he or  she uses,  but  there's  no reason to  give the utility information about  the 
customer's  personal  habits.   Yet this  is  exactly what detailed metering will  do if  that 
information is left intact within the power signal.  Power customers need an alternative to 
putting that sort of unnecessary trust in their utility.
In some states, utilities are legally restrained from releasing personally identifying 
information to a third party without written consent from the customer [6].  However, 
most states do not have standard definitions of “personally identifying information,” or 
formal privacy policies addressing the proper use of power data [7].  The consumer has 
no recourse but to simply trust the utility itself not to abuse the information which could 
be gleaned from the detailed metering; and as indicated by the lawsuits against utilities in 
5the wake of smart meter installations [8], such trust in the good intent of utilities is not 
likely to be forthcoming.
On top of that, large exceptions are made for law enforcement.  In at least one 
case, this loophole has led to extensive police perusal of numerous customers' usage data, 
looking for  usage they consider  “unusual.”   This  exception  even went  so far  as  law 
enforcement  having  its  own  password  to  the  utility's  database  [9].   The  police  are 
required to have a warrant to monitor the phone lines going into a home but are not 
currently  constrained  legally  from  watching  through  the  power  lines,  despite  the 
constitutionally questionable nature of such action [6]. 
Existing laws can only discourage, not prevent, abuses by individuals within the 
utility or law enforcement – or by hackers with the ability to compromise the utility's data 
storage,  communication with the meters, or even the meters themselves.  Attempts at 
digital protections of the measured data are in place but are severely flawed.  Even as 
smart meters are beginning to be deployed across the country, gaping security holes are 
being uncovered.  Several vulnerabilities have been reported in AMI devices, allowing an 
attacker  (with  physical  access  to  the  device)  to  obtain  the  usage  data  and  network 
authentication keys, giving the attacker access to all user data being transmitted from 
other  devices  as  well  [10].   The  protocols  on  which  the  wireless  communication  of 
metering data takes place also have known vulnerabilities [11], so an attacker need not 
have physical access to a meter to be able to intercept data in transmission.
Such paltry protections are entirely inadequate for the preservation of individual 
privacy.   Moreover,  even  if  we  assume  digital  protections  can  prevent  unauthorized 
6parties from hijacking usage information from the meter, data transmission system, or 
data storage – and that legal protections of the data will prevent misuse or release of 
usage information – nothing is to stop someone from intercepting the power signal itself 
except for the minor inconvenience of concealing the monitoring device.  In order to 
obscure this information from all avenues of abuse, we must go to the source, preventing 
that information from being carried by the power signal at all.  To do so, we must first 
examine how NILM can be used to extract personal information from a power signal.
How Personal Information Is Extracted
Current  and  developing  techniques  for  NILM  are  fairly  diverse  in  approach. 
Some of the more popular techniques  use genetic algorithms to develop profiles for 
different  devices  or  use  clustering  algorithms  to  link  patterns  in  the  signal  to  other 
patterns caused by the same (or similar) devices.  However, all depend on the analysis of 
one or more features of the power signal: real power, reactive power, the resulting power 
factor, various harmonics, etc.  Inferences about the sources of the signal are made based 
on the values (and changes in the values) of these features.  Use of a greater number of 
features allows for more precise identification of disaggregated appliances or machines, 
as there can be a great deal of overlap between different devices on some features.  For 
example, the real power consumption of a blow-dryer might be very similar to the real 
power consumption of a toaster;  but if the reactive power is factored into the feature 
profile for each device, the inductive motor of the blow-dryer can easily be differentiated 
from the toaster's heating elements.
7Information can be gleaned from the different features of a power signal  in a 
variety  of  ways.   Figure  2 shows  a  breakdown  of  some  basic  approaches.   In  this 
framework, features can be analyzed based on
• Instantaneous or average value 
• Changes in the value of the feature
These values can be evaluated based on 
• The magnitude of the value (or change) itself 
• The time at which the value or change was measured.
This  framework  helps  to  separate  specific  methods  of  extracting  personal 
information from the power signal into rough categories and allows for the development 
of targeted defenses against those categories.  A defense against one category of attack 
will  not  necessarily  protect  against  an  attack  from another  category.   For  example, 
altering  the  net  power  factor  of  a  facility  would  help  to  disguise  its  loads  from 
instantaneous/average-value-based  extraction  techniques  but  would  provide  little  help 
against techniques based on changes in power factor.
While the steady state values of applicable features can give some information 
about their source, the points where feature values change are more commonly used when 
attempting to disaggregate a collection of loads.  The change in the value of the feature is 
generally indicative of some state change of an individual load and so gives specific 
information about that load's contribution to the aggregate signal.  Again, these changes 
can be analyzed based on magnitude or on the time at which they occur (either absolute 
8time or in the context of some sort of periodic signal).
In order to obscure the potentially revealing information inadvertently encoded in 
the power signal, these features must be modified.  An effective technological defense 
against unauthorized monitoring  combines various techniques to hide the identifying 
characteristics in both the levels and changes in each applicable feature.
Personal Information Derived From Aggregate Levels
Some  information  can  be  gleaned  without  even  needing  to  disaggregate  the 
individual  load signals,  just  by looking at  the  overall  power consumption  over  some 
period.  Current low-resolution data collected by manual meter readings can be used to 
make inferences  about  the  activities  and devices  combined to  create  that  data.   This 
method is exactly how police in Austin, Texas, conducted what effectively amounted to 
warrant-less  searches  of  private  homes,  looking  for  “disproportionate”  usage  – 
warrantless searches covering thousands of Austin residents [9].  Fortunately, the amount 
and  granularity  of  information  extractable  from the  data  is  severely limited,  and the 
activity in Austin is currently just one isolated incident.  It is a minor vulnerability in  
comparison to what can be done with higher-resolution data.
When  a  time  dimension  is  added  to  the  aggregate  load  signal,  far  more 
opportunities for deduction arise.  In a recent study, the researchers' software was able to 
deduce a subject's sleeping habits and detect whether or not the inhabitant was home, 
with about 90% accuracy.  These results were acquired using only real power usage data 
over time at 15-second resolution [1].  Periods with very low activity could indicate that a 
9person is  away or  sleeping.   Periods  of  high  usage/activity give information about  a 
person's  lifestyle;  is  he a night person or a  morning person, habitual  or spontaneous, 
Luddite or technophile, etc.?  Even without the signal-processing power necessary for 
detailed load disaggregation, a running measure of power usage within a home, office, 
manufacturing  plant,  government  research  facility,  etc.  provides  an  easily  exploited 
window into the activities of the inhabitants and the nature of the devices contributing to 
the signal.
Such information would be of interest to a number of different parties currently 
without such direct access to information about personal habit.  Insurance companies are 
always eager to obtain detailed information about their customers for rate calculation; 
perhaps  a  person  seen  to  have  poor  sleeping  habits  would  be  given  higher  health 
insurance rates, or a person who often arrives home around the time bars close will be 
flagged  by  his  auto-insurer  as  a  drunk-driving  risk.   Marketers  would  certainly  be 
interested in getting information about the lifestyles of potential customers, to allow for 
more focused ad campaigns.   These examples of potential  privacy violations and the 
examples to come (as well as many others) have been proposed elsewhere [5].
Personal Information Derived From Level Changes
As instantaneous  data  gains  resolution,  it  becomes  possible  to  isolate  distinct 
changes in feature values and to read information from those level differentials.  These 
recognizable level shifts are the basis of most load disaggregation techniques.  When 
individual load events can be isolated and compared to other load events, patterns emerge 
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and can lead to precise load identification (see Figure 3).  Once individual load signals 
can be separated out,  it  becomes possible to make inferences about the nature of the 
appliances.  Perhaps a particular shift in signal features is caused by a security system 
being activated or deactivated, or a particular brand of refrigerator may have a discernibly 
different impact on the overall load signal than a competing brand.
Again,  marketers  would have a  strong incentive to obtain such information if 
possible.  The ability to separate those who already use your product from those who use 
a  competitor's  product (and from those who do not currently use any similar  device) 
would give an incredible advantage to any company planning targeted advertising.  On a 
more  sinister  note,  a  criminal  using  hacked  meter  data  to  canvass  an  upscale 
neighborhood could conceivably target specific houses for the particular devices seen to 
be in use there.
Once individual loads are identified and separated, a great deal of information can 
be gathered by watching their usage over time.  An observer would be able to track which 
devices one uses more frequently than others,  deduce one's daily routine from which 
devices are run consistently at specific times, or infer other personal characteristics from 
one's  device  usage.   Thankfully,  the  well  of  personal  information  available  in  every 
power signal has not yet been tapped to its full potential; however, with the expansion of 
data introduced by smart meters, it's  only a matter of time before that information is 
extracted and put to use.
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Fig. 3: Examples of revealing data embedded in power consumption data
Home Energy 
Data Over Time
Large, 
distinctive spike 
facilitates load 
identification
Period of low activity 
(except for automated 
devices) suggests 
absence
Identical spikes at the same time each day could reveal 
personal habit
12
CHAPTER 3: APPROACH
Theoretical Hardware Specification
The method described in this paper causes actual changes in the power signal 
drawn by a particular facility, and therefore requires the use of some extra hardware to 
create these distortions.  Figure 4 shows the basic setup simulated for testing purposes.
The particular electronics enabling the implementation of the method laid out in 
this paper are not critically important.  Any number of setups can be used, provided they 
can provide fast changes to power signal level.  A high-level model was used for testing 
purposes, whose behavior can be specified using just a few parameters.  It is worth noting 
that  while  the  hardware  simulated  for  testing  used  only power  drawn from the  grid, 
similar  masking  behavior  could  be  achieved  with  fewer  constraints  using  on-site 
generation.
Testing Model
An abstract,  highly simplified hardware model was used in testing (Figure  5). 
The particular electronic implementation of such hardware is outside the scope of this 
paper – the use of a loosely defined model allows for the data obfuscation techniques 
discussed here to be implemented on a variety of different hardware setups.  The focus of 
this thesis is on how to obscure load information in the externally visible power signal 
using such a device, not how to build one.
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The simulated hardware used in testing can be described simply, using only two 
parameters: maximum charge rate and storage capacity.  Conceptually, it can most easily 
be described as a controller hooked up to a bank of energy storage hardware, with the 
controller  monitoring  the  unaltered  power  signal  generated  by  the  target  loads  and 
dictating current flow into and out of storage based on that input.  However, with just a 
few more  parameters,  a  wider  range  of  implementations  could  be  used  as  well  (for 
example,  integrating  on-site  renewable  energy sources  to  alter  the  signal  rather  than 
storing/releasing grid power).  For testing purposes, the limits on charge and discharge 
rates are assumed to be identical.
Existing Analog
The  closest  existing  approximation  of  the  hardware  needed  to  physically 
implement these techniques would be equipment used to manage the output of variable, 
intermittent resources, such as wind farms.  The peak times for power output of wind 
turbines are largely during troughs in demand, and vice versa.  When the turbines are 
generating, the precise level of wind input cannot be controlled, only how much of the 
available power is harnessed.  Equipment to store excess power until it is needed allows 
the wind farm to utilize more of the available power.  A hardware system to serve this 
function  has  been  proposed  [12]  and  could  potentially  be  re-purposed  to  mask  load 
signals.
In principle, the interaction of the wind turbines and this storage equipment is the 
same as the interaction of the simulated hardware and load data used here.  The only 
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difference is in scale and purpose of the signal modification.  Similar hardware could just  
as easily distort the externally visible load signal generated by a facility as control the 
output of a wind farm.
The Load Signal
A number of different characteristics of the power signal might be used to identify 
and monitor the individual contributing loads, but the two major features observed by 
smart meters are real power and power factor.  A simple real power signal has been used 
to deduce private activity within a residence [Error: Reference source not found]; while 
use of power factor as well could certainly give additional distinctions between similar 
loads, its usefulness is secondary to real power consumption.  Therefore, the distortion 
method analysis here will focus on the real power component of the signal.  A similar 
approach might be employed to disguise the power factor signal given the right hardware. 
The constraints on distortion level would be structured somewhat differently, but the core 
principles carry over.
Probability Metric
The  probability  measure  used  here  is  one  designed  for  statistical  clustering 
applications.  Given a list of cluster centroids, it provides p ix  : the probability that any 
given point  x should be associated with cluster  i  based on its proximity to all known 
centroids.  d i x is the distance of point x from centroid i.  In this application, d i x
is  defined as  Euclidean  distance.   This  metric,  given in  (1),  was  designed  such that
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p ix d i x =ci for some constant ci [13].
p ix =
∏
j≠i
d j x
∑
k=1
m
∏
j≠k
d j x
(1)
This allows any observed level change x to be related statistically to each known 
load.  Such a relation will prove useful to this investigation.
Ambiguity Metric
The  masking  technique  discussed  here  is  based  on  the  idea  of  quantified 
ambiguity, an objective measure of the difficulty in discerning the motivating load event 
in an observed change in the power signal.  
In Information Theory, uncertainty is quantified with the idea of entropy, a metric 
of disorder.  Given a collection of m states, each with an associated probability p i (for i  
= 1,2,...m), the entropy of the system is defined in (2):
S=−∑
i=1
m
pi log2 p i (2)
If the probabilities are defined as functions of an observed event  x, the system 
entropy may  also  be  expressed  as  a  function  of  such  observations  and  plotted  over 
various values of x (as in Figure 6).
Distortion Techniques
Just as a number of techniques can be used to extract information from the signal, 
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different approaches can be taken with the aim of obscuring that same information.  Even 
within the subset  of  analytic  techniques  focused on changes in  signal  level,  different 
methods of  obfuscation  can give  varied  levels  of  protection.   Two  approaches  were 
compared in testing: simple fuzzing and targeted entropy maximization.
Fuzzing
Simple fuzzing applies a randomly selected offset in power draw at certain points. 
To utilize the available storage strategically, the range of possible offsets is weighted low 
when storage usage is high, and high when usage is low.  It offsets individual events 
simply,  without  requiring  the  controller  to  have  any  knowledge  of  the  loads  it  is 
obscuring (time series example in Figure 7).  Because of its simplicity, it was used as a 
control during testing.
Targeted Entropy Maximization
Targeted entropy maximization is based on a plot of entropy values as a function 
of observed event magnitude, evaluated over a specified collection of known loads.  It 
uses some knowledge of the system being masked to make more efficient use of the 
resources available, picking an offset level with maximum impact on the ability of an 
external observer to distinguish between signal changes generated by different loads.  A 
time series example of this sort of masking is given in Figure 8.  
Using information about the various loads contributing to the signal, this method 
is able to make more informed choices of offset to apply.  While the fuzzer sees each 
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event in isolation, this method can use information about how other loads will affect the 
signal to find the best choice for this set of loads.  With some idea of what other events  
will appear in the signal later, strategic offsets can be made to minimize the ability of a 
third party to infer anything about the activities generating the observed power signal. 
Plotting the entropy of various potential event magnitudes based on a set of loads allows 
the  controller  to  clump  the  appearance  of  actual  events  in  more  ambiguous  areas, 
reducing the ability of an outside observer to pin down the load connected with any given 
event.
Applying Distortions
Both approaches used in testing are governed by the same rules defining when 
signal offsets are applied or adjusted.  The application of offsets have two different goals, 
often  in  opposition.   The  primary  end  of  the  masking  signal  is,  of  course,  to  hide 
identifiable load events; however, as the simulated hardware has limited storage capacity, 
resource usage can be a consideration as well.  When the available storage is nearing full 
charge, the controller's ability to  offset the signal downward is crippled; likewise, as the 
storage approaches complete discharge, the controller is limited in its ability to raise the 
observed signal.  Maintaining mid-level storage usage allows the most flexibility to apply 
offsets in either direction as needed.
Three conditions prompt the controller to reevaluate the applied offset:
1. A significant change in signal level is detected.
2. Storage is approaching full or empty.
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3. A specified timeout is triggered.
In the event of any of these three conditions, the controller changes the flow of 
energy to or from storage, raising or lowering the observable signal level.  Depending on 
which obfuscation approach the controller  is  using,  different  considerations are given 
different weights while determining the appropriate offset to apply (as laid out in Figure 
9).
A condition 1 trigger puts obfuscation as the highest priority.  At the moment of 
an observable load event it is far more important to obscure the event than to maintain a 
strategic usage level in storage.  However, it still takes the current storage utilization into 
consideration.  If the storage is nearing capacity, potential offsets which would require 
unsustainable  levels  of  charging  are  not  considered  –  instead,  the  entropy values  of 
various discharge rates are compared.  Likewise, when storage is nearly empty, charging 
offsets are favored over discharging masks.
Conditions 2 and 3 put a higher priority on pulling storage toward a strategically 
flexible  level.   As  there  are  no  actual  load  events  to  obscure,  any change  in  either 
direction  will  provide  some  level  of  misdirection  to  an  attempted  analysis  of  the 
observable signal.  Condition 2 is, naturally,  more urgent from a storage management 
standpoint;  condition 3 may not  even come into play if  the storage capacity is  small 
relative to the magnitude of the masks being applied (causing the storage unit to charge 
and discharge fairly rapidly).  Condition 3 allows extraneous signal events to be inserted 
(independently of the available storage capacity), camouflaging the timing of genuine 
load events.
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Fig. 4: Positioning of masking hardware in the power system
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Fig. 7: Example time series plot of a raw power signal and its fuzzed output
Fig. 8: Example time series plot of a raw power signal and its masked output
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CHAPTER 4: PERFORMANCE METRICS
Given the variety of approaches to power signal analysis which could facilitate a 
breach in privacy, it is difficult to define a single metric to evaluate a defensive method's 
effectiveness.  While multiple metrics are used here, even together they cannot give a 
complete quantification of the described defensive methods' ability to prevent invasive 
analysis.  However, by using multiple, granular metrics based on inherent properties of 
the information in the signal, different methods can be compared to one another and a 
general sense of their relative effectiveness can be established.  
For the purposes of evaluating and comparing the targeted masking approach to a 
simple fuzzing scheme, two metrics are used: one to measure the distortion of individual,  
identifiable events in the signal and one to examine the information revealed by emergent 
patterns over time.  The first metric looks at the individual methods' abilities to prevent 
observed load events from being classified correctly, and the second shows how well they 
can mitigate the use of multiple load events to deduce the load composition of the signal.
Single-Event Metric
The focus of the masking technique described here is load events, observed as 
changes in signal level.  Analytic techniques applied to these observed events will seek to 
match an event (or sequence of events) to a known load, to isolate its effect on the overall 
signal.   In order to evaluate a masking technique's ability to prevent such analysis, a 
general  metric  is  needed  which  will  quantify  the  ability  of  any  number  of  analytic 
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approaches to correctly classify observed events.
The  distance-based  probability  measure  described  earlier  allows  for  a  general 
evaluation of a masking technique's effectiveness on this front.  Given knowledge of the 
unmasked signal (and the loads creating it), the probability that an observed event will be 
associated with the correct device can be calculated easily.   This evaluation does not 
constitute a precise metric of success.  Certain attacks might be more likely to classify the 
event correctly; certain others might be less likely to get it right.  However, it does give a 
granular metric for evaluating the relative effectiveness of different masking techniques 
without relying on the strengths or weaknesses of a specific attack.
Combined-Event Metrics
These  give  measures  of  the  error  introduced  to  attempts  at  identifying  loads 
statistically, gathering data from many events over time.  They are not concerned with the 
odds  of  specific,  individual  events  being  classified  correctly  but  instead  look  at  the 
overall distribution of visible events and their timing.
An analytic technique using an unguided learning approach to load disaggregation 
will use event trends to determine characteristics of the loads creating them.  A masking 
technique  may  distort  individual  events  but  leave  the  overall  signal  vulnerable  to 
statistical analysis.  By comparing what information might be gleaned from the obscured 
signal to the actual load composition, a technique's ability to prevent such deductions can 
be evaluated.  Two combined event metrics were used to evaluate the performance of the 
distortion methods: event cluster centers and average event frequency.  
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The first method, based on event cluster centers, aggregates all actual events and 
finds  their  cluster  centers.   This  approach  gives  a  sense  of  how  events  are  altered 
independent of the additional, spurious changes in signal level injected by the controller 
managing the storage.  If an attacker were to use some unmasked characteristic of the 
signal (for instance,  power factor)  to differentiate between actual load events and red 
herrings  created  by  the  controller,  this  metric  evaluates  what  information  could  be 
gleaned.  Additionally, cluster information including the spurious events created by the 
controller  could provide some additional insight;  however,  the clusters created by the 
controller-created events vary significantly over different runs and are therefore difficult 
to track over consecutive simulations.   Using only the altered magnitudes of the real 
events  provides  a  cleaner  picture  of  the  effects  of  different  methods  and  different 
simulation setups.
The second metric is the expected number of events per hour.  While the raw 
signal  probably is  not predictably periodic,  if  the mask is  changed too often then its 
effects can be filtered out.  It is worth noting that under some circumstances drastically 
increasing the event frequency can be desirable (for instance, if one wishes to hide an 
actual  decrease  in  activity);  however,  increasing  the  frequency is  a  simple  matter  of 
setting the desired time-out in the controller.  Strategic use of available storage will have 
a smaller necessary impact on the frequency of observed events, making it more difficult 
to filter out the masker's effects.
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CHAPTER 5: TEST CASES
Power Signal Used
The data used in testing is the real power consumption of a 30W lamp over the 
course  of  two  weeks.   This  provides  a  simple  case  which  should  allow  for  easy 
identification of the load (absent any obfuscation).  The lamp is a basic two-state device 
with no significant variation of consumption in either state.  When it is turned on, its 
power draw stays within a few watts of 30; it draws no current at all when turned off. 
Low levels of noise exist in the signal, so a noise threshold of 5W was used in analysis 
(of  both the raw and distorted  signal).   Observed events  above 5W were considered 
significant; events below 5W were disregarded as noise.
Permutations of Relevant Hardware Parameters
In  order  to  investigate  the  marginal  benefits  of  each  hardware  parameter  – 
maximum charge rate and storage capacity – a range of values was used in testing.
Maximum Charge Rate
The rate at which the storage can draw power from (or inject power into) the 
unmasked signal at any given time defines its ability to alter identifiable load events in 
the power signal.  Increases in charge rate directly impact the nature of the resulting, 
obfuscated signal.
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Since  the  magnitude  of  the  signal  being  masked  is  the  primary  factor  in 
determining how effective a given offset value is, the values of maximum charge rate 
tested were based on the scale of the test load.  Tests ranged over limiting values from 
5W to 60W in 5W increments to evaluate how masking ability changed as the model's 
ability to completely mask the 30W magnitude on/off events increased.
Storage Capacity
The available energy storage at any given time defines the amount of time the 
hardware  can  sustain  a  particular  level  of  masking.   High-capacity storage  gives  the 
controller  more freedom to  draw or  inject  higher  levels  of  power for  more  extended 
periods.   Low-capacity  storage  requires  the  controller  to  operate  with  many  short 
charge/discharge cycles.
The important factor for storage is not the absolute size of the storage but its size 
in relation to the maximum charge rate.  A setup with a low maximum charge rate will 
not require as much storage as a setup with a high charge rate.  Therefore, to allow a 
comparative analysis  of “low” storage capacity and “high” storage capacity,  the total 
amount of energy storage available was defined by how long it could sustain a constant 
charge at the given rate.  Values up to 3 hours of charging (in 15-minute increments) were 
used at each of the given charge rates.  Therefore, a 5Wh storage capacity for a 5W 
charge  rate  could  be  roughly compared to  a  30Wh capacity for  a  30W setup.   This 
approach  allowed  for  evaluation  of  the  effect  storage  size  had  on  performance 
independent of the charge rate being used.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
Influence of Charge Rate
Simulated hardware setups were tested with charge rates ranging from 5W to 60W 
(twice the magnitude of the load events being hidden) in 5W increments.  
Single-Event Metric
As shown in Figure 10, the effectiveness of both fuzzed and masked approaches 
steadily increased until reaching the 30W magnitude of the actual load events, and then 
both  level  out.   Figure  11 shows just  the  points  of  continued improvement  for  each 
method, which show a strongly linear progression in both but with steeper improvements 
using the targeted masking approach.
Combined-Event Metrics
Figures  12 and  13 show the distribution of all  observed signal events using a 
variety of charge rates (up to 30W).  On the far left is the unaltered distribution of the raw 
signal,  and each subsequent column shows the distribution of a separate run with the 
charge rate incremented by 5W.  With a charge rate as low as one-third of the actual load 
event magnitude, each method is able to begin mixing the load events with spurious level 
shifts.  Figures 14 and 15 give a cleaner view of the event distribution at this point.  No 
clear  distinction  is  apparent  between distorted  load  events  and events  created  by the 
controller.
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Figures 16 and 17 remove the spurious events and show the distortion of events 
stemming  from the  actual  load.   The  separation  is  not  perfect  (as  suggested  by  the 
presence of 0 magnitude “events” and outlying noise points), but the cluster shifts over 
each iteration are apparent.
Figure 18 shows the trends of the observable cluster centers belonging to actual 
load events.  While both fuzzing and targeted masking tend to drift the centers toward 
zero, masking does so more directly.
Influence of Storage Capacity
Different levels of storage capacity were used in testing, defined relative to the 
charge rate limit of each run.  Storage capacities able to support up to 3 hours of constant 
charge  or  discharge were  tested,  in  15-minute increments.   Storage capacity was not 
found to have a notable impact on the success of masking individual events, as shown in 
Figure  19.   It  did,  however  show an evident  influence  (over  a  certain  range)  on the 
observed event frequency, as shown in Figure 20.
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Figures
Fig. 10: Gains from increased charge rate level out or diminish past  
the level of the load.
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Fig. 11: The effectiveness of the mask increases linearly as the charge rate  
approaches the load level.
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Fig. 12: Observed event clusters over 6 runs of fuzzing with varied charge rate limits
Fig. 13: Observed event clusters from 6 runs of targeted masking with varied limits on charge  
rate
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Fig. 14: Histogram of fuzzed events at 10W charge rate with 10Wh of storage
Fig. 15: Histogram of masked event distribution at 10W charge rate with 10Wh of storage
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Fig. 16: Fuzzed load events
Fig. 17: Masked load events
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Fig. 18: Trends of cluster centers (fuzzed and masked) over varied charge rates
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Fig. 19: Increased storage capacity does not improve the masking of  
individual events.
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Fig. 20: The impact of storage capacity on observed event frequency
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
Targeted Masking
In each of the performance metrics defined for these tests, the targeted masking 
approach outperformed the control method.
Single-Event Metric
As shown in Figure 11, the targeted masking approach makes significantly more 
effective  use  of  the  available  charge  rate  when  obfuscating  individual  events.   Both 
methods display linear improvements with respect to maximum charge rate, but targeted 
masking achieves a slope twice as steep as random fuzzing.  For any given charge rate, 
targeted masking is able to obscure load events roughly twice as effectively as random 
fuzzing. 
Combined Event Metrics
The results in Figure  18 are not as definitive (given the traces of noise in the 
clusters), but targeted masking still shows the same gains as observed by the single-event 
metric  (as  would  be  expected,  given both  of  their  dependence  on  the  average  event 
offset).   These  results  are  not  entirely  redundant,  however,  as  the  clusters  allow the 
positive and negative events to be compared independently.  
Figures 16 and 17 show another advantage of targeted masking – less quantitative 
but  certainly worth note.   As the charge rate  available  increases,  the fuzzing method 
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naturally spreads out the load events, but targeted masking draws them all in toward the 
noise  threshold.   When  the  charge  rate  reaches  the  same  level  as  the  signals  being 
obscured,  the  fuzzed  events  are  strewn  about,  but  the  masked  events  are  mostly 
indistinguishable  from noise.   An  outside  observer  would  have  significant  difficulty 
determining that an actual load event had occurred at all.
Event-Frequency Metric
As shown in Figure  20, smaller storage capacities have a large impact on the 
frequency of observed events.  Anything larger than about 1.5 hrs of storage levels out for 
both  targeted  masking  and  fuzzing;  however,  again,  masking  makes  better  use  of 
available resources than fuzzing.  The raw signal shows an event approximately every 4 
to 5 hours.  Both distortion methods increase the event frequency (to maintain strategic 
storage levels); however, the increase injected by masking is notably lower than that of 
random fuzzing.  Some runs with enormous storage (6 hrs, 12 hrs, 18 hrs, and 24 hrs of 
charging supported) showed the fuzzed signal frequency levels out at .44 events/hr, and 
the masked signal frequency level at .34 events/hr (compared to the raw frequency of .23 
events/hr).
Hardware Parameters
Based on the simulated results, some recommendations can be made in regards to 
physical  implementation  of  the  modeled  hardware.   Whether  or  not  current  energy 
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storage  technology  can  deliver  on  these  recommendations,  or  do  so  economically, 
depends greatly on the nature of the loads being protected.
Charge Rate
It was found that charge rate was the primary factor in determining the ability of 
the controller to obscure individual load events.  Rates approaching the magnitude of the 
signal  being distorted gave linearly increasing protection;  rates higher  than the target 
signal did not provide any additional advantage.  
When combined with the spurious signals generated by the controller, relatively 
low charge rates provided reasonable levels of protection.   This finding suggests that 
facilities wishing to disguise some large load events need not obtain distortion hardware 
capable of giving an offset equal to the largest load.  As shown in Figures 12, 13, 14, and 
15 a fraction of that level can provide a reasonably garbled distribution.  As similarly 
sized  load  events  tend  to  merge  into  one  another,  the  hardware  required  to  provide 
adequate protection will  be determined by the largest gap between known load event 
magnitudes.
Storage
Storage  capacity  proved to  have  little  influence  on  the  effectiveness  of  either 
approach beyond a certain base level.  Where that base level falls depends on the raw 
event  frequency,  but  subsequent  increases  in  storage  space  have  little  effect  on  the 
performance of the masker.
38
Potential Improvements
The  effectiveness  of  this  system  has  been  demonstrated  on  a  simple  case; 
however, some improvements could be made to cope with more complicated attacks or 
complex loads.
Revise Probability Metric
The current probability metric relies on discrete, consistent, single events.  Many 
loads display a more complicated profile in the power signal, and an updated probability 
metric to better represent those sorts of loads would allow this method to more effectively 
hide those patterns.
Time/State-Sensitive Entropy Mapping
The current  system uses  one,  precalculated entropy map to determine optimal 
event offsets.  However, some attacks may use knowledge of load timing or state to aid in 
identification.  While recalculating the entropy map on the fly may be complicated for 
some systems, use of a number of precalculated maps for different circumstances would 
allow a more effective response to such attacks.
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